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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 56

MARCH 1958

No. 5

SHOULD THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
DISCARD ITS VEST?*

Daniel M. SchuylerfI. INTRODUCTORY
HE venerable rule of property kno,vn as the rule against
perpetuities has recently been subjected to numerous searching and critical analyses, some of which will presently be discussed. Thus far nothing has been published dealing with, and
only Professor Simes has touched upon,1 what seems to the present
writer to be the most serious problem engendered by the common
law rule in its commonly accepted form, i.e., the notion that the
rule is concerned only with remoteness of vesting. It is the purpose of the present discussion to examine the concept of vesting
as related to the rule and to attempt to answer the question posed
by the title of this article. To accomplish this objective it will
be necessary first to advert to the history and purpose of the rule,
to consider the application and consequences of violation of the
rule in its present form and whether or not it performs a function
in modern jurisprudence, and also to review the major criticisms
which have thus far been launched against the rule. No attempt
will be made to treat statutory substitutes which take the form
of prohibitions against the "restraint of the absolute power of
alienation"; what follows will be concerned with the common law
rule and certain recent modifications of it.

T

A. Statement, History and Purpose of the Rule
Professor Gray's final pronouncement of the rule, that "No
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years after some life in being at the creation of the interest,"2
•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed.
tMember of the Illinois and Wisconsin Bars; Professor of Law, Northwestern University.-Ed.
l SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 67-68, 80-82 (1955). The author wishes
to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Lewis M. Simes for his careful examination
and analysis of the manuscript and for his ·helpful suggestions in connection therewith.
2 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §201 (1942) (hereinafter cited as
GRAY).
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has of course become the rubric within which all future interests
must fall in order to be valid. To the layman it would surely
seem singular that a rule of high public policy, the very purpose
of which is to devastate intention, should be couched in unintelligible abstractions. Indeed, the lawyer who remembers his
law school struggles with "lives in being" and "vesting" may not
view the rule very differently. Perhaps, however, the lawyer may
find comfort in Holmes' epigram (uttered in another connection)
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 3 For Gray's
statement of the rule, with all of its infirmities, is probably as
good a shorthand restatement as could be made of the patchwork
of decisions extending over a period of more than two centuries,
which, taken as a whole, constituted the common law's assessment of where the line should be drawn as to the length of time
that title-clogging future interests might remain extant. Thus,
except in historical perspective, one may doubt that very much
sense could be made of the rule against perpetuities-or for that
matter of many rules of property. It is too much to expect that
the ultimate composite of the judgments of a large number of
judges of different eras and backgrounds, none of whom could
be certain of his final objective, should be a model of logic. In
fact, it ought to be a source of wonderment, and it is a very great
tribute to the common law, that the rule against perpetuities is
as logical as it is.
Since the history of the rule-which is inseparably interwoven
with its purpose-has been admirably outlined in Gray's treatise,4 it need not long detain us here. It should, however, be
observed that no rule against perpetuities would be necessary in
a system of law which recognized no future interests. This is so
because the rule is not a rule against restraints on the alienation
of property. The rules against restraints on alienation are concerned mostly with direct restraints; the rule against perpetuities
deals with the indirect restraints created by future interests. It
is not strange, therefore, that the rule against perpetuities did
not take firm root until shortly after the decision in 1620 in
Pells v. Brown5 where the indestructibility of the executory inter3 New York Trust Co. v. £isner, 256 U.S. 345 at 349 (1921) (federal estate tax of 1916
held constitutional).
4 GRAY, 126-176.
5 Cro. Jae. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). Except for Smith v. Warren, Cro. Eliz. 688,
78 Eng. Rep. 924 (1599), earlier cases appear to have held conditional limitations to be
destructible. GRAY, §§142-147.
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est seems first to have been unequivocally recognized. Destructible
future interests had not offered the alluring and mischievous
possibility of endless dead-hand control which the judges were
quick enough to see lurking in the shadow of a future interest
which could never be destroyed and which might, unless contained, impair a title for a thousand years or even more. Nor is
it strange that the judges who participated in the construction
of the confining mechanism were unwilling to fix its limits at
the beginning.6 Rather it is to their credit that they recognized
the limits on their oracular capacities and took the matter step
by step.7
B. Application and Effect of the Rule

Although the rule seems clearly to have been designed to
further the marketability and development of real property and
hence the economic welfare of an agrarian society, 8 there is no
doubt that it applies with equal force to legal interests in personalty.0 It applies also to equitable interests in real and personal

6 The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681): "They
will perhaps say, where will you stop, if not at Child and Bayly's Case? Answ. Where?
why everywhere, where there is not any Inconvenience, any Danger of a Perpetuity; and
whenever you stop at the Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee, there we will stop in the
Limitation of a Term of Years ...• Now the Ultimum quod sit, or the utmost Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee, is not yet plainly determined; but it will be soon found out, if
Men shall set their Vvits on Work to contrive by Contingencies to do that, which the
Law has so long laboured against; the Thing will make it self evident, where it is inconvenient, and, God forbid, .but that Mischief should be obviated and prevented."
Per Lord Chancellor Nottingham.
7 In The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 at 36, 22 '.Eng. Rep. 931 (1681), Lord
Chancellor Nottingham interpreted Wood v. Sanders, 1 Ch. 131, 22 Eng. Rep. 728 (1669),
as holding that a contingency "wearing out in the Compass of two Lives in Being, the
Remainder over ..• might well be limited upon it." See also Lloyd v. Carew, Show.
Par!. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (1697). More lives were allowed in Scatterwood v. Edge, 1
Salk. 229, 91 ·Eng. Rep. 203 (1699), and in Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (1805), it was established that any number of lives reasonably capable of
ascertainment could be selected. The 21-year period in gross was an outgrowth of the
holding in Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. T. Talb. 228, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (1736), where an
interest which might not vest until the expiration of a life in being and the minority
of .the taker was held good. In Cadell v. Palmer, 1 CI. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833),
it was held that a 21-year period in gross could be added to lives in being.
8 6 .AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY 13-14 (1952) (hereinafter cited as AMERICAN I.Aw OF
PROPERTY); CAREY AND SCHUYLER, !LLINOIS I.Aw OF FUTURE INTERESTS §475 (1941) (hereinafter cited as CAREY AND SCHUYLER); GRAY, §§119, 268; MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MORRIS AND LEACH); SIMES, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 33-40 (1955); SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
2d ed., §1212 (1956) (hereinafter cited as SIMES AND SMITH).
9 GRAY, §§202, 323; MORRIS AND LEACH, 12; SIMES AND SMITH, §1235.
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property even in instances where a trustee has an unrestricted
power of sale, 10 and the argument has been forcefully put forward that it should apply to the duration of trusts even though
all outstanding interests are irrevocably vested. 11 The acceptance
of Gray's notions as to the scope of the rule, however, would
preclude its _application to the duration of trusts per se and
would require the conclusion that a trust could last forever if
all of the future interests created by it were certain to vest within the limits of time. 12 But even Gray and his disciple, Professor
Kales, were dissatisfied with this view and suggested that some
rule akin to the rule against perpetuities should apply to the
postponement of the enjoyment of vested equitable future interests.13 As to this point, no clear-cut rule of decision exists14
and scholars are not in agreement, 15 so it remains a hazy area
in a field of law with respect to which long years of trial and
error have developed a good deal of certainty concerning many
of its other phases.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, but speaking with
greater particularity, the ru1e applies, where future interests are
remote, to contingent executory interests and to contingent remainders, at least where these are rendered indestructible by
protective legislation.16 As a result, the rule is of course applicable to contingent class gifts and in this connection it is important to note that, in its orthodox sense, the rule demands not
only that a class gift vest within the prescribed period but also
that the precise shares of each member of the class be determined
within that time. 17 It applies also to options in gross to purchase
property,18 to the creation and exercise of powers of appointment19

10 GRAY,

§269; SIMES AND SMITH, §1249.

11 SIMES AND SMITH, c. 40. And see MORRIS AND LEACH, 311-316.

12 GRAY, §412. And see id., §§232-246.
13 Id., §§121.1 to 121.8; KALES, FuruRE

INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§658-661, 677, 681, 732-741
(1920).
14 SIMES AND SMITH, §1393 at 245-247. And see CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§478, 480; id.,
1954 Supp., §§478, 480.
·
15 SIMES AND SMITH, §1391, n. 2.
16Executory interests: GRAY, §§160-164; SIMES AND SMITH, §1238. Contingent Remainders: CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §496; GRAY, §§284-286; MORRIS AND LEACH, 197-203; SIMES
AND SMITH, §1237.
17 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.26; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §497; GRAY, §§369875; MORRIS AND LEACH, 95-96, 118-125; SIMES AND SMITH, §1265.
18 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §§275•
275.1; MORRIS AND LEACH, 213-215; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244.
19 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§24.32-24.33; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483; GRAY,
§§510-540; MORRIS AND LEACH, 131-150; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1271-1276.
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and in England and perhaps in some American states to fiduciary
powers.20 It even applies to charitable gifts which may not take
effect until too remote a time except in cases where the remote
gift follows a valid prior gift to charity.21
Since the rule is supposed to be concerned only with remoteness of vesting, it has no application to reversions or vested remainders,22 nor indeed to those executory interests which, at least
for convenience, may for the moment be referred to as "vested."23
Rights of entry,24 possibilities of reverter,25 resulting trust interests26 and options appendant to long term leases,27 however
remote, have not generally been regarded in this country28 as
subject to the rule.
The non-application of the rule to the contingent future interests to which reference is made in the last sentence of the
preceding paragraph seriously undermines the logic of the concept
of the rule as one which is applicable to remote contingent interests and inapplicable to vested interests. That this is not the
only illogical aspect of the rule will be more particularly shown
when the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting is discussed. For the moment it is sufficient to recall that the rule insists that in testing the validity of a future interest we must determine whether, at the time the interest was created, there was
any possibility, however remote, that the interest might not
vest within the limits of time. 29 If, according to this test, a future
interest is found to violate the rule, absolute invalidity is the
consequence, no matter how devastating this may be to the inten20 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROP£RTY, §24.63; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §484; GRAY, §§487509.19; MORRIS AND LEACH, 225-235; SilllES AND Sl\lITH, §1277.
216 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.38-24.40; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §491; GRAY,
§§589-607; MORRIS AND LEACH, 179-188; SilllES AND SlllITH, §§1278-1287.
22 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.19; GRAY, §205; SIMES AND SlllITH, §1235.
23 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.20; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §480; SIMES AND
Sl\lITH, §1236.
24 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHULER, §493; GRAY, §§304-310;
MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SlllITH, §1238.
25 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §493; GRAY, §313;
MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SMITH, §1239.
26 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §495; GRAY, §327.1; S!l\lES AND SMITH, §1240.
27 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §230.3;
SilllES AND SMITH, §1244.
28 In England rights of entry are subject to the rule. MORRIS AND !.EACH, 205. So are
possibilities of reverter but according to only one case. Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 S.J. 213 (1944). The English cases also hold that an option given a tenant for
years to purchase the fee is bad if exercisable at too remote a time. GRAY, §230.3, n. I.
29 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; MORRIS AND LEACH, 68-89; SIMES
AND SMITH, §1228.
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tion of the maker of the instrument of gift.30 Moreover, in some
jurisdictions at least, if the invalid attempt to create a future
interest is regarded as inseparably interwoven with prior and
otherwise valid gifts, these too will be void.31 Thus the rule is not
only illogical in some of its applications and non-applications,
but it is also characterized by extreme harshness when it is
transgressed.

C. Does.the Rule Perform a Modern Function?
Even the briefest consideration of the original purpose and
development of the rule and of its present day form and application is enough to induce the conclusion that a program to
modernize the common law rule against perpetuities may well
be apropos. Certainly there is virtually automatic justification
for reappraisal of any rule of law which had its origin almost
three and a half centuries ago in a totally different social order.
And, if that were not enough, the peculiarities of old age that
have come to characterize the rule, its stringent and relentless
effects, its unnecessarily punitive qualities, and, above all in the
opinion of the writer, the notion that the mortal results of its
application or non-application should be made to depend upon
the occult concept of vesting-all of these factors-combine to
signalize the worth of probing deeply in search of possible improvements. But one should first be satisfied that some rule
against perpetuities has modern utility. For, if there is no present
need to limit the time when future interests vest in possession
or otherwise, then the rule should simply be abolished.
Of course, no responsible person would advocate that an
ancient common law rule of property should be summarily
jettisoned, but it by no means follows from the mere age of a
rule that its non-retroactive abandonment will be attended with
undue disturbance. Illustrative of this is the abrogation in England and in many American jurisdictions, after careful consideration, of the rule in Shelley's Case32 and the rule of destructibility
of contingent remainders.33 In neither instance have any untoward

30 6

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.44; GRAY, §§629-631; MORRIS AND LEACH, 239SIMES AND SMITH, §§1288-1290.
316 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.48-24.52; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§180-181;
GRAY, §§247-249.9; MORRIS AND LEACH, 162-165; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1262-1264.
32 SIMES AND SMITH, §§1563-1568.

242;

33 Id., §§207-208.
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consequences been apparent. Experience would thus justify the
abolition of the rule against perpetuities if one could honestly
conclude that there is no present need to limit the time when
future interests should vest in possession or otherwise. This problem has received distinguished attention,34 but no one has yet
suggested that no rule against perpetuities should be retained.
Indeed, although Professor Simes declines to accept the conventional rationalizations of the rule, his thoughtful and thoroughgoing treatment of this subject35 closes with a defense of some
rule against perpetuities which is unlikely to be pierced in the
foreseeable future. It would of course be superfluous to review
his arguments in detail here, but it will serve a purpose to
summarize them briefly and to offer a few comments concerning
them.
Professor Simes first analyzes the rule against perpetuities in
terms of its original purpose, i.e., as Gray put it, "forwarding the
circulation of property which it is its policy to promote." 36 Professor Simes concludes that the essence of the rationale of the rule,
as advanced in the English cases and by such eminent authorities
as Jarman, Lewis and Gray, is this: "The Rule against Perpetuities
furthers alienability; if it were not for this Rule, property would
be unproductive and society would have less income."37 But this
is no longer true, Professor Simes argues, for modern dispositions
of substantial wealth are for the most part dispositions of securities in trust. And even if the trustee does not have an unrestricted
power of sale according to the trust instrument or by statute,
equity can permit the sale of trusteed property which has become
unproductive. Moreover, quite apart from this doctrine, where
corporate shares or bonds are held in trust, property owned by
the corporation is freely alienable. Professor Simes also shows
that English legislation (which could be adopted in American
jurisdictions in lieu of a rule against perpetuities) has in effect
abolished legal future interests and made all future interests
equitable, at the same time allowing only two legal estates in
land, the fee simple absolute and the term for years. If a "trust
for sale," pursuant to which trustees are required to sell realty

84 Fraser,

"The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 6

MINN.

L. REY. 560

(1922); MORRIS AND LEACH, 13-18; SIMES, PUBUC POUCY AND THE DEAD HAND 32-71 (1955).
85 Id. at 40-63.
86 GRAY, §2.1.
37 SIMES, PUBUC Poucy AND THE DEAD HAND 36 (1955).
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is not created, a "settlement" is, and where there is a settlement,
"there is always some person, usually the life tenant, who has
power to sell in fee simple."38 The proceeds will be held in trust
for the benefit of those who were originally given an interest
in the property in question. Professor Simes concludes that, "In
England, when property is affected by a future interest, there is,
in nearly all cases, some person who can sell absolutely or in fee
simple." 39 Accordingly, if the policy of the rule against perpetuities is merely to further alienability, that policy is satisfied
by the English legislation just described and can be as well satisfied by like legislation in any jurisdiction which recognizes future
interests. In addition, Professor Simes points to the expanding
concepts of the power of eminent domain, especially as illustrated by the English Town and Country Planning Act of 1947,40
which seems to permit anyone interested in acquiring property
for more productive use to do so where the intended use is practicable and approved as a part of a development plan. In such
a case land can be acquired by a governmental board and turned
over to the individual who proposes to improve it. Kindred legislation exists also in this country41 and, since it relies for its implementation on the power of eminent domain, it has an overbearing effect on outstanding future interests and hence tends
to minimize the need for a rule against perpetuities as a means of
confining the clogging effect of future interests.
A second rationalization which has been advanced in favor
of a modern rule against perpetuities is the notion that such
a rule tends to prevent undue private concentrations of wealth.
Professor Simes rejects this as a justification for the rule since he
feels that, "undue concentration of wealth is an evil which can
best be combatted by tax legislation, rather than by perpetuity
rules." 42
Finally, it has been suggested that, "limitations unalterably
effective over a long period of time would hamper the normal

381d. at 45.

Id. at 46.
40 10 &: 11 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1947), discussed by SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND
48:52 (1955). Sec especially Hanily v. Minister of Local Government & Planning, [1952]
39

2 Q. B. 444.
41 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 67½, §§63-91 (Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act);
65 N.Y. Laws (McKinney Unconsol. 1949) tit. 11, §3301 et seq. (Urban Redevelopment
Corporations Law).
42 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 57 (1955).
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operation of the competitive struggle."43 In other words, in
the absence of any rule against. perpetuities, natural selection resulting from survival of the fittest, would be jeopardized. This
Professor Simes also dismisses as a valid vindication of the rule.
If it is unsound to permit the unfit to be protected for many
generations, then why shelter even one generation? Moreover,
the idea that the weak should be weeded out in the economic
struggle is inconsonant with the "elaborate welfare machinery''
afforded by modem society which is "not organized on a theory
of survival of the fittest, but of survival of the weak."H
Despite the foregoing, Professor Simes concludes that there
is a true basis for a rule against perpetuities in that, "It is socially
desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living
· members and not by the dead." 45 In furtherance of this position
he points to the tendency toward stagnation which would result
from perpetual dead-hand control, if only in the limitations which
this would place upon the venturing of risk capital and indeed
upon the expenditure of capital for consumer goods, which, under
certain circumstances, may be very desirable from a social point
of view. Finally, the dead hand could, through the mechanism of
shifting interests, impose standards of conduct on beneficiaries for
generations to come if there were no limit upon the time when
future interests could take effect.
As to dispositions in trust one may agree with Professor Simes
that the rule against perpetuities cannot be rationalized today in
terms of furthering alienability when the trustee has an express
power of sale. Likewise, in non-trust gifts, it is true that legislation, similar to the English legislation described above and insuring the existence in some person of a power to convey land free
of future interests, would eliminate the need for a rule against
perpetuities concerned solely with the marketability of real estate.
But not all trusts contain powers of sale and many American
states do not have statutes creating fiduciary powers of sale as
a matter of law. Nor do courts of equity freely direct the sale of
trust property where no such power exists46 and even if they did
the encumbrance created by the necessity of resort to the judicial
process is not lightly to be ignored. Furthermore, it is not

43 4 PROPERTY RE'srATEMENT 2132 (1944).
44 SIMES, PUBUC PouCY AND THE DEAD HAND

58 (1955).
59.
46 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§167, 190.4 (1956).
451d. at
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likely that many American legislatures could readily be induced to go as far as the British Parliament did in limiting
the freedom of settlors and testators to impose, upon property
dispositions; restrictions in the form of future interests which
have long been recognized.47 And certainly, in the area of public
control of property, most American states are not yet prepared
to go as far as the British did in the English Town and Country
Planning Act of 1947. One may therefore differ with Professor
Simes' statement that, "if . . . alienability to secure productivity
is the sole purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities, then we have
reached a point where the Rule should be completely abolished."48
Of course, on the assumption that substitutionary legislation of
the type described would be adopted, one would be less inclined
to quarrel with this position. But before this can come to pass
a great deal of legislative inertia must be overcome; meanwhile
the rule still seems to serve some of its original purpose.
Whether a rule against perpetuities is warranted for the more
metaphysical reason that, somewhat like the Sherman Act, it
furthers a healthy competition is obviously open to debate. As
opposed to Professor Simes' expressed reasons for disbelief in
this as a ground for retention of the rule, it can be argued that
although the desire to protect one's immediate family should be
sanctioned as an incentive to productivity, this must be balanced
against the undesirability of cloaking generation after generation
of weaklings with the security of a great fortune. This is not, as
Professor Simes argues, inconsistent with present day "welfare"
thinking, for the proponents of security want security for allnot just for a select few. So it is not entirely illogical to urge
that even in a welfare state the rule against perpetuities performs
the societal function of striking a fair balance between what
Professor Leach has called the "dynastic impulses" of the very
wealthy and a reasonable and commonly shared aspiration that
children and grandchildren be spared some of the struggle undergone by their ancestors. However, whatever one's conclusion in
this regard may be, there is much to be said for Professor Simes'
view that this balance should be maintained through the taxing
process and not by a rule of property. '
47 In addition to the Town and Country Planning Act, note 40 supra, see the Law
of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20 (1925), the Settled Land Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 18 (1925) and
the Trustee Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19 (1925), all discussed in SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEAD HAND 44-51 (1955).
48Id. at 53.
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With Professor Simes' judgment that too much control of
the living by the dead is undesirable and that the rule against
perpetuities is desirable because it tends to prevent the dead hand
from reaching too far into the future, no sensible person could
disagree. The analogy that he draws between testamentary restrictions and "special legislation, written by the dead hand, applicable only to particular persons and property, and as unchanging as the ancient laws of the Medes and Persians,''49 is persuasive.
So is his argument that, by restricting the dead hand, the rule
tends to free risk capital, which is a necessity unless our basic
economic concepts are to be abandoned. Acceptance of this point
of view leads at once to agreement with Professor Simes' broader
conclusion that some rule against perpetuities is needed. More
especially is this true if one believes, as has been suggested above,
that the rule still performs a function in furthering the alienability of property and that it perhaps serves at least some role
in promoting competition. If these things are so, our attention
may appropriately be directed toward seeking to adapt the rule
to its modern setting.
IL

CRITICISMS OF THE RULE AND SUGGESTED REFORMS

Most of the major criticisms which have been directed at the
rule against perpetuities are interrelated. It is therefore virtually
impossible, as will be apparent from the discussion which follows,
completely to separate one indictment from another. However,
in the interest of clarity, an effort will be made to categorize,
so far as possible, and to illustrate in concrete terms the reason
for, the scholarly assaults which have been made upon the rule
during the past several years. Reforms which have been suggested
will then be considered in conjunction with examples of the
evils they are designed to cure. Finally, an attempt to weigh the
efficacy and practicability of these suggestions will be made before
specific treatment of the problems created by the rule's concern
with remoteness of vesting is undertaken.

A. The Rule Is Illogical and Harsh
I. In the Period Which It Specifies. As it finally crystallized,
the rule against perpetuities requires that future interests must
vest within lives in being and 21 years from the date of their
creation. Any number of measuring lives having no relationship
49Id. at 88.
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to the dispositions in the instrument of gift50 may be selected,
provided that they and the time when they come to an end are
reasonably capable of ascertainment.51 The 21-year period may be
a period in gross unrelated to any measuring lives or to the
minorities of any potential takers. 52 A child who is conceived is
a life in being for purposes of the rule and therefore the period
or periods53 of gestation of a c_hild or children en ventre is often
in a sense added to the period of the rule, but a period of nine
months in gross may not be added. 54
Considering the length of time that the judicial process took
to settle upon the period of the rule,° 5 it is questionable whether
any clear-cut statement of the reasons for the period ultimately
decided upon can be regarded as much more than an ex post
facto rationalization. It is said, however, that lives in being and
21 years was selected as the prescribed period because the rule
was designed to control unreasonable family settlements and it
is reasonable that one disposing of property should be able to
provide for all of the members of his family whom he knew, and
for their children during their minorities. 56 Whether or not this
is a retrospective appraisal it makes good sense, and it has afforded
the springboard for suggestions that the period of the rule should
in some respects be modified.
Although no severe attacks have been made upon the period
of the rule as it affects family dispositions, some proposals for
change have been made. In the light of the rationale that a
testator should be able to make provision for those whom he
knew, it has been suggested that the difficulty of ascertaining and
tracing large numbers of unrelated lives may call for some further
restriction on the number of measuring.Jives that may be selected.57 It has also been suggested that draftsmen could be more

r;o Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805).
Villar, [1929) 1 Ch. 243 (all the lineal descendants of Queen Victoria living
at testator's death). Compare Re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All E. R. 274 at 280-281: "As a
result of my decision the clause in question can still be validly employed in the case of
a testator dying in 1925; but I do not at all encourage anyone to use the formula in the
case of a testator who dies in the year 1943 or at any later date." Per -Morton, J.
52 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
53 GRAY, §§220-222.
54 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372 at 421, 422, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). GRAY, §222.
55 The rule's development extended over upwards of 200 years from the decision in
Ohild v. Baylie, Cro. Jae. 459, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618), and perhaps prior thereto (GRAY,
§§153-154) to Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
56 MORRIS AND I.EACH, 65.
57 Id. at 66-67.
51 Re
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certain of achieving their clients' objectives if, as an alternative
to lives in being and 21 years, they were permitted to choose a
period in gross of as long as 80 years.58 Finally, the view has
been advanced that the 21-year period in gross (which Gray
thought should never have been extended beyond minorities50)
is too short, the theory being that if one should be permitted to
provide for his grandchildren he should be able to keep capital
out of their hands for a longer time than lives in being and the
21-year period in gross may permit. 60
As to non-family dispositions, uniformity in recommendations
for reform has been lacking insofar as time limitations are concerned. As appears later in more detail, the exemption from the
rule of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry (which are
seldom employed in family settlements) is quite generally thought
to be unjustified. 61 Opinion varies, however, as to the extent
to which these interests should be subjected to temporal restrictions. Apparently some proponents of reform feel that lives in ·
being and 21 years, at least as an alternative period, would afford
an apt time limitation, 62 despite the fact that a possibility of
reverter or a right of entry is almost never established for the
purpose of providing for children and more remote issue of the
creator of the interest. With respect to options in gross (as distinguished from options appendant to leases which most commentators seem to feel should not be restricted63), proponents of reform would apparently agree that lives in being are inappropriate
as a measure of validity, for lives in being would almost always be
irrelevant and would constitute an artificial intrusion upon a
purely commercial transaction. 64 But there is disagreement as
to whether options in gross should be limited in time at all and
if so to what degree. 65

58Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. 18, at 7, 30 (1956) (hereinafter
cited as Law Reform Committee Report).
59 GRAY, §§186-188.
60 MORRIS AND LEACH, 67-68; SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 68-69 (1955).
61 Law Reform Committee Report 20-21, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 207-211; SIMES,
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 70-71, 79-80 (1955).
62 Law Reform Committee Report 20; MoRRis AND LEACH, 207; Leach, "Perpetuities
Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. REV. 1349 at 1354-1355, 1362-1365 (1954).
63 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; Law Reform
Committee Report 19, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 218; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244, p. 162. But
see GRAY, §230.3.
6i 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56, p. 142; GRAY, §330.3, pp. 367-368, n. 2;
Law Reform Committee Report 19-20, 32; MoRRis AND LEAcH, 217.
115 Pro: CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §§330 to 330.3; Law Reform Committee
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2. In Its Requirement of Absolute Certainty of Vesting. As
is well known, the rule against perpetuities is a pessimist or an
optimist depending upon one's point of view. That is but another
way of expressing the rule's requirement that future interests
to which it applies must be absolutely certain, at the time of their
creation, to vest within the prescribed limits of time. It is not
enough that a future interest might or even almost surely would
do so; if it was not sure to do so, the interest is bad and indeed
was void from its inception. This extraordinarily despairing approach not only invalidates many interests which, if permitted
to stand, would have vested within the period of the rule, but
it also complicates the mathematical aspects of the rule since
one must exhaust all possible assumptions as to births, deaths,
and often the happening of other events, to be sure one has done
one's sums correctly.66 This aspect of the rule, which necessitates
(often in retrospect) assumptions of the most improbable possibilities, has generated some fantastic decisions. These in tum have
been responsible for Professor Leach's very articulate invectives, 67
presently to be discussed, against the present rule.
The rigors of the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting
cannot, in theory at least, be mitigated through the interpretative
process; the formula is that you construe the instrument of gift
as though there were no rule against perpetuities. Having thus
construed the instrument, you then apply the rule and it is
simply unfortunate if its inexorable mathematics destroy the
dispositions intended. 68 In other words, the rule is a rule of

Report 19-20, 32 (21-year period recommended). Con: 6 .AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§24.56, pp. 142, 143-145 ("neither lives in being nor a period of twenty-one years, nor
both together, have any significance •.."); Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror,'' 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 736-739, 748 (1952); MORRIS AND
LEACH, 220.
66 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 728-734 (1952);
MORRIS AND LEACH, 68-69; SIMES AND SMITH, §1228.
67 Leach: "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARv. L. R.Ev.
1329 (1938); "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents," 68 L. Q. R.Ev. 35 (1952);
"Perpetuities in Perspective: 'Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721
(1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1954);
"An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3)
15 (1954).
68 See, e.g., Pearks v. Mosely, 5 App. Cas. 714 at 719 (1880): "You do not import the
law of remoteness into the construction of the instrument, -by which you investigate the
expressed intention of the testator. You take his words, and endeavour 10 arrive at their
meaning, exactly in the same manner as if there had been no such law••••" Per Lord
Selbome.
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property and applies irrespective of intention. That only a whimsical grantor or testator would knowingly make a void gift is
supposedly of no consequence. Fortunately for many testators
(or, more accurately, the intended objects of their bounty), courts
frequently, if tacitly, ignore this harsh precept.69
The foregoing may be best understood when illustrated in
concrete terms. Thus, suppose that T by his will gives property
in trust to pay the income to A for life, and at his death to distribute the corpus of the trust to the eldest son of A, living at A's
death, who becomes a college graduate.70 A will have an equitable
life estate if he is alive at T's death and an attempt will have been
made to create an equitable future interest in his eldest son who
survives him and has graduated or does graduate from college.
This, however, is invalid even though when T dies A has ten
sons who are all college graduates and even though all of them
survive A. The requirement of absolute certainty of vesting demands that we assume (no matter if the validity of the interest
is not litigated until after A's death) that all of A's sons might
have predeceased him; that he might have had another or more
sons; that one or more of these hypothetical afterborns might"
have survived A; and that the eldest of these might not have graduated from college until more than 21 years after the death of A
who was a life in being at T's death. Thus the rule is violated,
on the basis of hypothetical suppositions, by a future interest
which, if allowed to stand, would have vested at A's death-21
years short of the period permitted by the rule. The gift could
have been saved, of course, had the draftsman referred to "the
eldest son of A who is living at T's death and who survives A," for
then whoever took the gift would have been a life in being at
T's death. But that was not done, and, under orthodox views
of the rule, the italicized words cannot be added or implied by
construction.
Another illustration of the requirement of absolute certainty
of vesting is to be found in the so-called "unborn widow" cases.
Suppose a testamentary gift by T to A for life, remainder to
his widow for life, remainder to such of A's children as are living
at the death of the widow. T has always been fond of A's wife,
69 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.45; CAREY AND SCHuYLER, §508; GRAY, §633;
MORRIS AND LEACH, 242-245; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1288-1290.
70 Cf. Abbiss v. ;Burney, 17 Ch. Div. 211 (1881), where the gift over was "unto such

son of William MacDonald, Archdeacon of Wilts, as should first attain the age of twentyfive years. • • ."
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W, who is alive when T makes his will and who also survives T.
A is 65 when T dies; Wis 63. A and W have four children ranging in age from 32 to 40. A predeceases W who later dies leaving the four children surviving her. Thus, if allowed to take
the property willed to them, the children would take 21 years
before the expiration of the period of the rule because A and W
were both lives in being at T's death. The ulterior gift to the
children is nevertheless void.71 The rule requires the assumption
that W might predecease A, that A might marry a woman unborn at T's death, that she might have children by A and that
she might live for more than 21 years after the death of the last
to die of A and all of his children by W. A's children by his
second marriage would then be the ultimate takers and, since the
gift to A's children was to such of them "as are living at the death"
of his widow, their "interests" would not have vested within the
period of the rule. These assumptions present the rule in one
of its most illogical aspects, for under the facts supposed it is
clear indeed that when T referred to A's "widow" he meant W
who was a life in being. If the draftsman had said that, or if
a court so interpreted the will, the gift over to the children would
be good.
Proponents of reform argue that since proper draftsmanship
would have prevented both of the gifts above supposed from
being destroyed, the rule is illogical in striking down a future
limitation which, had it not been invalid, would in fact have
vested well within the limits of time. 72 This being so, the argument runs, the spirit of the rule is not violated. The rule is thus
too harsh since it visits "venial faults with oppressive retribution."73
3. In Accepting Fantastic Hypotheses. Closely related to the
716 Al\!ERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; MORRIS AND LEACH, 70-71;
SIMES AND SMITH, §1228 at 119-120.
72 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.21 to 24.23; Law Reform Committee Report
8-9, 10-12, 15-16; MORRIS AND LEACH, 73-74, 79-81, 83-89. See also, in addition to Professor
Leach's articles, cited note 67 supra, the following: notes, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1174 (1947);
97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 263 (1948); Bregy, "A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities," 23 TEMP. L. Q. 313 (1950); Newhall, "Doctrine of the 'Second Look,'" 92
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 13 (1953); Tudor, "Absolute Certainty of Vesting under the Rule
Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic," 34 BOST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 129 (1954); Cohan,
"The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from Old Nutshells,"
28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 (1955); Bogert, "Public Policy and the Dead Hand: A Special Book
Review," 6 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 51 (1956).
73 Per Cardozo, J., in Jacob&: Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 at 242, 129 N.E. 889
(1921), a contract case holding that the contractor would not be denied recovery because
of an insignificant deviation from specifications.

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

699

rule's requirement of absolute certainty of vesting is its acceptance
of fantastic hypotheses, both prospectively and retroactively. Some
of the most notorious of these owe their notoriety to Professor
Leach's picturesque and playful sobriquets. Those which appear
to have piqued him the most74 and which are particularly spectacular are the rule's assumptions that: (1) a man or woman, regardless of age or physical condition, is capable of fathering
or bearing children (the "Fertile Octogenarian"); (2) that a child,
however young, is capable of procreation (the "Precocious Toddler"); and (3) that a will may be probated or some other event
may occur more than 21 years after a testator's death (the "Magic
Gravel Pit").
The doctrine of the fertile octogenarian may be illustrated
by assuming the same facts which were supposed in the preceding
subdivision, i.e., that T creates a testamentary trust to pay the
income to A for life and at his death to pay over the corpus to
the eldest son of A, living at A's death, who becomes a college graduate. We have seen that the ultimate gift is void even
though at T's death A has ten sons who have already graduated
from college. We have also seen that if no son of A born after
T's death could take, the ultimate gift would be good. Let us
now suppose that A is T's daughter and that she is 65 years old
when T dies. Obviously she can have no more children so anyone who lives to answer the description of a taker of the ultimate
gift is bound to be one of A's ten sons who were living at T's
death. Hence the ultimate gift is bound to vest within the period
of the rule. But it is invalid nonetheless, for the rule against
perpetuities presumes that A is capable of having more children75
and once this assumption is made all of the other assumptions
made in the preceding subdivision come into play and with
nuclear vigor operate to destroy the future interest.
The precocious toddler requires a little more imagination
but he may be conjured up. In Re Gaite's Will Trusts, 16 T
had made a testamentary gift of income to A for life and following
that a gift of principal to "such of her grandchildren living at my
death or born within five years therefrom who shall attain the
age of 21 years...." At T's death, A was 65 and had two living

74' Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65
L. R.Ev. 721 at 731-734 (1952).
75 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787).
76 [1949] 1 All E. R. 459.
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children and one grandchild. Only by supposing that A might
remarry, that she might have another child and that that child
might have a child within five years from T's death, could the
gift to T's grandchildren be invalid. That would mean that a
child under five would have to be presumed capable of producing
an offspring. Although the ~court held the gift to the grandchildren good, it reached that result on the footing that a marriage of the hypothetical precocious toddler under the age of
16 would have been void under English Law. 77 It would certainly
have been more sensible to say that the suppositions infant could
not have had a child within five years from T's death and that
therefore any grandchildren who answered the description of
takers must do so, if _at all, within the period of the rule.
The exhaustion of the magic gravel pits was the event upon
which, in Re Wood,7 8 the testator's issue, living upon the happening of that event, were to take. The gravel pits were in fact
exhausted within six years after the testator's death, but the
gift to his issue was held void because the gravel pits might have
lasted more than 21 years. Gifts to take effect upon the happening
of so-called "administrative" or other more common contingencies, e.g., the probate of a will, 79 the payment of debts80 or the
ending of the war81 are equally offensive to the rule despite the
extreme unlikelihood of any such event occurring beyond the
prescribed limits of time .. Again they could be saved by proper
draftsmanship, or by temperate judicial construction. But draftsmen continue to be fallible and the attitude of courts toward
their foibles continues to be something less than benevolent.
From the foregoing examples it must be apparent that the
extreme hypotheses prerequisite to the results reached are but an
extension of the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting.

77 This aspect of the case is criticized in Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 733-734 (1952). But compare Morris,
"Rule Against Perpetuities and Age of Marriage," 13 CoNv. 289 (1949); Momus AND
LEACH, 82-83.
78 [1894] 3 Ch. 381.
79 Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45,
170 N.E. 699 (1930). But see Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893). And compare Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §153a, altering this rule in Illinois.
80 GRAY, §§415-416. And see Hodam v. Jordan, (E.D. Ill. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 183.
81 But in Monarski v. Greb, 407 Ill. 281, 95 N.E. (2d) 433 (1950), a charitable gift
contingent upon -the inability to locate certain enemy aliens or to pay legacies to them
within "three years after the Armistice of War II •.•" was held valid on the surprising
ground that the contingency :was "certain to all sane persons to occur well within •••
the period limited •by the rule against perpetuities."
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Consequently, the arguments of proponents of reform directed
against the fantastic suppositions in which the rule at times requires one to indulge are much the same as those put forward
in opposition to the requirement of certainty. However, as to
cases such as those discussed in this subdivision, it is in addition
argued with a good deal of reason that a conclusive presumption
of fertility or a presumption that an administrative contingency
will not occur within the period of the rule is an affront to common sense and hence a serious reflection on a system of law which
is supposed to be logical.
4. In Its Application to Class Gifts. As before stated the
rule against perpetuities is even more stringent as applied to
class gifts than it is in its application to gifts to individuals.
When a gift is to a class the entire interest given must of course
be certain to vest within the period of the rule. But, more than
that, if the gift is void as to any member of the class the entire
gift will be held to be bad.82 A typical case is a testamentary
gift to A for life followed by a gift over to such of his children
as attain 25. 83 Even if one of A's children has reached 25 at the
testator's death and has thus attained a vested interest, the gift
to the children of A fails. According to the usual rules as to the
closing of classes the class remains open until A dies. Meanwhile
he may have more children and one or more of them may not
reach 25 and thus attain a vested interest until more than 21 years
after the death of the last to die of A and all of his children who
were living at T's death. Since the class gift is regarded as inseparable it is said to fail entirely; it is not even good as to those
children of A who were living when the testator died and who
had to reach the specified age, if at all, within their own lifetimes.
Proponents of reform urge that this application of the rule
is based on historical error, that no sensible explanation has ever
been offered in support of it, and that it is especially illogical
since most testators would prefer that their bounty should be
bestowed upon some members of a class than to have their attempted gift fail altogether. 84 Thus, it is said, it would be better
82 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.26; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §497; GRAY, §373;
MORRIS AND !.EACH, 95-96; SIMES AND SMITH, §1265.
83 This is in substance Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 'Eng. Rep. 979 (1817).
Si 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.26; Law Reform Committee Report 14, 31;
Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1329 at
1336-1338, 1352-1353 (1938); MORRIS AND !.EACH, 118-125.
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in the example given to split the class and to allow the children
of A who were living at the testator's death to take to the exclusion of any born thereafter. When the rule of destructibility\ of
contingent remainders prevailed, remaindermen who answered
the description of takers at the ending of the supporting estate
took to the exclusion of other previously potential takers. 85 Likewise courts have not invalidated class gifts in their entirety merely
because the rules concerning the closing of classes often arbitrarily
exclude potential takers as objects of a class gift.86 Why should the
rule against perpetuities cause such devastation when other equal- ·
ly important rules have not produced like results in like situations?
5. In Its Non-Application to Possibilities of Reverter, Rights
of Entry and Resulting Trusts. It is elementary learning that
where, by the use of language of limitation, a determinable fee is
created, a possibility of reverter remains in the maker of the
gift. So, if property is given to a church "so long as it shall be
used for church purposes," the church has a determinable fee
and the donor has a possibility of reverter.87 If the property ceases
to be used for church purposes, the fee automatically reverts to
the donor or his successors. When language of condition, as
distinguished from language of limitation, is employed, the fee
is not a determinable one, but is called a fee subject to a condition subsequent and the maker of the gift has a right of entry.
Thus, if the gift supposed were altered to read to the church in
fee simple, "but if the property shall cease to be used for church
purposes the grantor may re-enter the property," the church has
a fee subject to a condition subsequent and the donor has a right
of entry. 88 If the property ceases to be used for church purposes
the fee does not automatically revert to the donor or his successors, but, upon re-entry or the performance of some equivalent act,
he or they get the fee back. A resulting trust, which might often
85 Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. Div. 211 at 229-230 (1881): "According to my experience
it has always been assumed, without argument, that where the fee is vested in trustees
upon trust for a man for life, and after his death upon trust for such of his children
as .•. shall attain twenty-one, . . . and at the death of the tenant for life there are
some children adult and some minors, the minors, if they live to attain twenty-one, will
take along with the others; but if equity had followed the law, then, inasmuch as there
were persons capable of taking at the death of the tenant for life, namely, the adult
children, they would have taken to the exclusion of the children who were minors,
as was the case where the limitations were legal." Per Jessel, -M.R.
86 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.39-22.45; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§236-244; MOR·
RIS AND LEACH, 103-118; SIMES AND SMITH, §§634-648.
87 North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (1908); First Universalist Society v.
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892).
88 SIMES AND SMITH, §242.
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be more accurately denominated a "possibility of a resulting
trust," is the residual interest in the maker of a gift or his successors which remains if property is trusteed and the trust is or
becomes invalid or incapable of accomplishment. For instance, if
property is given to trustees for a particular charitable purpose
and if that purpose fails, the judicial cy pres power cannot be invoked to apply the property to another and like charitable objective and the trustees will hold the property on a resulting trust for
the benefit of the donor or his successors. 89 This type of interest
may well be analogized to a possibility of reverter and indeed
might be called an "equitable possibility of reverter" but for the
fact that it does not seem to be dependent for its existence on the
express use of language of limitation.
That the future interests described in the preceding paragraph
are contingent cannot be doubted despite the fact that it has been
thought at least arguable that the possibility of reverter and the
possibility of a resulting trust can be regarded as vested.90 However, in America, to the extent that the matter has been judicially
determined, all three interests are said to fall outside of the ambit
of the rule against perpetuities.91 In England the rule seems to
apply to rights of entry92 and perhaps to possibilities of reverter, 93
but not to resulting trusts. 94 Proponents of reform have urged
that the American view exempting possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry (except as incident to leases and mortgages) cannot
be justified,95 for interests of this kind may and do operate to clog
real estate titles for long periods of time and with unwonted
frequency. Some have thought that these interests should be made
subject to time limitations even stricter than those prescribed

4 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §413 (1956).
Possibilities of Reverter: ". • • [I]t could be argued that . • • possibilities of
reverter are vested interests, and vested interests as such should not be subject to the
rule.•• .'' SIMES AND SMITH, §1239, p. 147. Resulting Trusts: "[The] •.• resulting trust
is a vested interest, and therefore is not obnoxious to the Rule against Perpetuities.''
GRAY, §603.9.
916 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§493-494; GRAY,
§§304-310, 313, 327.1; MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1238-1240.
92 MORRIS AND LEACH, 205.
93 Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 S.J. 213 (1944). "However, this ••• has
been criticised, and cannot be said to have settled the point beyond question ••• until
some litigant carries the matter to the Court of Appeal." Law Reform Committee
Report 20.
94 GRAY, §603.9; Law Reform Committee Report 21.
95 Law Reform Committee Report 20-21; Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 at 739-745 (1952); MORRIS AND LEACH,
207-211; SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 70-71, 79-80 (1955).
89
90

704

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 56

by the rule against perpetuities96 and it has also been urged that
possibilities of resulting trusts should certainly be subject to the
rule itself.97
6. In Its Application to Options and Administrative Powers. In
England the rule against perpetuities is said to be applicable to
options in gross98 and even to options appendant to long term
leases.99 Specific performance will not be decreed against one other
than the optionee who has purchased from the optionor, but if the
optionor has not parted with the property subject to the option
the optionee may have specific performance.100 And even where
specific performance will not be granted the optionee may have an
action in damages against the optionor.101 In America the weight
of authority seems to be that options in gross are subject to the
rule102 and that the optionee may not recover damages against the
optionor.103 Options appendant to long term leases are not thought
to be subject to the rule in this country.104
Gray thought that all options should be subject to the rule,105
as indeed they ought logically to be if the rule is concerned solely
with remoteness of vesting. 106 Professor Leach would exempt all
options from the sphere of the rule's operation107 whereas others
would restrict options in gross at least to some degree and would
approve the American view that options appendant to long
term leases ought not to be fettered by arbitrary time limits.108
96 See, e.g., the Illinois so-called "Reverter Act" [Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §§37b-37h]
limiting the duration of these interests to 50 years. Til.is statute is discussed in CAREY
AND SCHUYLER (Supp. 1954), §§50-55. It was held constitutional in Trustees of Schools v.
Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N.E. (2d) Ill (1955). For statutes of like import, see 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62, p. 158, n. 18. A 30-year period is there recommended.
Id. at 157.
97 Law Reform Committee Report 21, 32.
98 London & South Western Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882).
99 Woodall v. Clifton, [1905] 2 Ch. 257.
100 Hutton v. Watling, [1948] Ch. 26, affd. on other grounds, [1948] Ch. 398, and
criticized in Walford, "Options of Purchase and Perpetuities," 12 CoNv. 258 (1948).
101 Wonhing Corporation v. Heather, [1906] 2 Ch. 532.
102 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56; GRAY, §§330.l; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244.
103 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920).
Other cases are cited in SIMES AND SMITH, §1244, p. 161, n. 38.
104 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; SIMES AND
SMITH, §1244, P- 162.
105 GRAY, §§330-330.3.
100 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the .Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv.
L. REv. 721 at 736-737 (1952).
107 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: •Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv.
L. REv. 721 at 737, 748 (1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1349 at 1355 (1954); "Perpetuities ,Reform by Legislation," 70 L. Q. REv. 478 at
490 (1954).
108 Law Reform Committee Report 18-20, 32.
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Since options to purchase are commercial devices it seems obvious
that they should not be subjected to a rule designed in the beginning to control family settlements. And certainly there is little
logic to the English view that specific performance may be awarded
in favor of the original optionor and that he may be subject to
damages if he has brea.ched the option by putting the property
subject to it beyond his control. On the premise that the option
is bad, indirect enforcement should be just as objectionable as
the direct sanction of specific performance.
Another aspect of the rule which is of greater concern to the
English bar than it is to American conveyancers is the application
of the rule to administrative powers commonly conferred upon
trustees, e.g., powers to sell, lease, mortgage, to appoint successor trustees or to invest and reinvest. Such powers, though exercisable beyond the period of the rule, have not generally been
held invalid in this country,109 but they are probably all subject
to the rule in England.110 Since the matter is undecided in many
American states and since Gray espoused the English view111 the
matter may not be free from doubt in those American jurisdictions where no authoritative decision has been rendered. Proponents of reform argue that administrative powers conferred
upon trustees should not be subject to the rule since for the most
part they further the very purpose which the rule itself was designed to promote, i.e., the fluidity of property.112 Hence the insertion of such powers in trust conveyances should be encouraged
and it should be made clear that they are exempt from the rule.
It should be observed that administrative powers are in this regard
to be distinguished from powers of appointment, of which a power
given a trustee to allocate beneficial interests in income or corpus
is a species, and which, if not personal to the trustee, may be exercised beyond the period of the rule if the trust may last longer
than that period. It may also be observed that if a trust cannot
last longer than lives in being and 21 years, no administrative or
other power granted the trustee could be exercisable beyond the
period of the rule.113

109 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.63; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §484; SIMES AND
SMITH, §1277.
110 MORRIS AND LEACH, 228-229.
111 GRAY, §§488-489.
112 Leach, "Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 47 HARv.
L. REv. 948 (1934). And see the authorities, in agreement, note 109 supra.
113 SIMES AND SMITH, §1391, p. 240, suggest that the rule should be that, "A private
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7. In Wholly Invalidating Interests Which Transgress It.
When property is given by will in trust to pay the income to A
for life and after his death to deliver the corpus of the trust to the
first son of A who shall reach 25, the gift over is too remote. If
there is a testamentary gift in trust to pay the income to the testator's children during their lives and upon their respective deaths
to pay over the corpus to such of their respective children as reach
25, the posterior gifts are equally bad. In each instance the disposition of the corpus of the trust is altogether void and the principal of the fund becomes intestate property even if the equitable
life estates are allowed to stand. If, in the second supposed case,
it is further assumed that the intestacy of the ulterior gifts results
in the entire beneficial interest in the trust property passing to the
equitable life tenants as heirs of the testator, some courts would
say that the whole trust scheme should fail and that the testator's
children should be allowed to take outright by intestacy. 114 So, too,
where one-third of an estate was left to a daughter in fee and the
other two-thirds were left in invalid trusts for the testator's two
sons, all of the dispositions were held to fail entirely.115 In the first
instance, in the absence of spendthrift or other protective provisions, it seems senseless that the equitable life estates should be
sustained when the equitable fee is at the command of the equitable life tenants; in the second instance, the validation of the
equitable life estate and the invalidation of the remote limitations
following it would result in one of the testator's children ultimately acquiring five-ninths of the testator's property despite a
reasonably clear intention that there should be equality of distribution between the family of the first child and those of the
other two. The conclusion that the entire disposition should in
each case fail is a manifestation of what has been called the doctrine of "infectious invalidity," 116 i.e., the view that where invalid
posterior gifts are inseparably interwoven with those which are
anterior to them the entire disposition will fail. Whether or not
this result will ensue is said to depend upon the intangible of

trust cannot be made indestructible, by its terms, for a longer period than a life or
lives in being and twenty-one years beyond." See also -MORRIS AND LEACH, 311-316.
114 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.48-24.52; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§180-181;
GRAY, §§247-249.9; MORRIS AND LEACH, 162-165; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1262-1264.
115 In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938), involving the former
Michigan statutory rule, but applicable nevertheless on the point of inseparability.
116 So denominated in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.48.
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what the testator would have wanted had he kno1m that he could
not do part of what he was trying to do.117
It will be noted that in the illustrations set forth in the preceding paragraph the invalidity of the bad gifts was the result of
the contingency that the taker or takers should attain the age of
25. Gifts contingent upon another person's dying under an age in
excess of 21 may be equally offensive to the rule. So if property
is given to A for life, remainder to his first born daughter, and if
such daughter shall die under 25 leaving children surviving her,
then to such of the daughter's children as survive her, the gift to
A's grandchildren is bad unless at the time it becomes effective A
has a daughter in being. If not, the first born daughter of A will
probably take an indefeasibly vested interest as soon as she is
born118 and even if she has a child and dies, let us say at 20, leaving that child surviving her, the child will not take under the
instrument of gift though of course he may take through his
mother.
Proponents of reform believe that the automatic invalidation
of future interests, regardless of when they would in fact have
vested, as illustrated in this subdivision, is too harsh.11° Various
proposed remedies and combinations of remedies, subsequently
discussed, are suggested.120 In the case of options in gross which
might be exercised beyond the period of the rule and which are
accordingly invalid, total invalidity is too drastic a penalty. If
these are to be subject to time a limitation such as 21, 30 or 50
years, n0 attempt to exceed such limitation should wholly invalidate them; 121 they should, as in the case of invalid accumulations,
be "void only as to the excess."122
8. In Its Purported Concern With Remoteness of Vesting
Alone. In the third edition of his treatise Gray recognized that vested future interests are often as capable of impairing the fluidity of
property as contingent interests and that the alienability of vested
interests "is not a sufficient ground for excluding them from the

117 CAREY
118 Where

AND SCHUYLER, §181.
a gift over is invalid the prior gift usually remains absolute according
to the weight of American authority. CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §176; id., Supp. 1954, §176;
SIMES AND SMITH, §§828, 830.
119 See the texts and articles cited note 72 supra. And see SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE DEAD HAND 66-67, 74-79 (1955).
120 See "Reforms Which Have Been Suggested," p. 709 infra.
121 GRAY, §330.3, pp. 367-368, n. 2; Law Reform Committee Report 19-20.
122 l JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 395-396 (1951); SIMES AND SMITH, §468.
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the operation of the Rule." 123 "It seems," he said, "that in the ideal
system of law ... no interests which did not vest in possession within the all~tted period of time be allowed. They are within the
practical reason of a Rule against Remoteness." 124 Professor Carey
and the writer, some sixteen years ago, expressed the view that,
"No concept of vesting or contingency or other abstraction has any
place in the solution of perpetuity questions." 125 More recently,
Professor Simes, though not without reservation, suggested that
those who would reform the rule should give careful thought to
eliminating from it the concept of vesting and to requiring tliat
most future interests should become possessory within the limits
of time.126
The reasons (which will of course be amplified later) for these
misgivings concerning the abstraction of vesting as the sacred emblem of the validity of a future interest may be summarized as
follows: (1) Many vested future interests impair the fluidity of
property to just as great a degree as do their contingent brethren.
(2) The concept of vesting is a feudal concept which arose in connection with the law of remainders and it is consequently difficult
if not impossible to apply it sensibly in testing the validity of
modem future interests which are for the most part executory
interests or the equivalent thereof. (3) Highly technical, and for
the most part illogical, rules of construction were developed in
furtherance of the rule of early vesting, which in tum was originally developed to mitigate the harshness of the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders.127 Without regard for their
original objective, these rules are invoked to determine whether
or not, for purposes of the rule against perpetuities, future interests are vested. Confusion has been the result. (4) This confusion has created a great area of unjustifiable uncertainty in the
solution of perpetuity problems. And although the concept of
vesting has the one advantage of injecting flexibility into an area
of the law where unjustly harsh results might flow from a completely rigid rule against perpetuities, there ought to be a less
abstruse and more logical way of maintaining an adequate degree
of flexibility.
123 GRAY, §972.
124 Ibid. Italics supplied.
125 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §474, p. 586.
126 Sn,rns, Ptrauc PouCY AND THE DEAD HAND 67-68, 80-82 (1955).
127 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule

46 !LI.. L. REv. 407 at 408-412 (1951).

of Early Vesting,"
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B. Reforms Which Have Been Suggested
I. Altering the Period of the Rule. It has been seen that five
proposals have been made with respect to the period of the rule:
(I) that there should be some restriction on the number of
measuring lives which may be used; (2) that a period in gross
should be added as an alternative to lives in being and 21 years;
(3) that the 21-year period in gross be extended; (4) that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry should be subject to temporal restrictions; and (5) that the same approach should be
applied to options in gross.
Dr. Morris and Professor Leach criticize the use of extraneous
lives as a measure of validity. They say that so many may be used
as to make "difficult and expensive ... out of all proportion to the
advantages to anyone of thus extending the period of perpetuities"
the tracing of the lives and determining the deaths of the persons
whose lives are chosen.128 They admit' that, "Any attempt to restrict the number of permitted lives by statute would involve
formidable difficulties of definition," but they say that "the magnitude of the task which would confront the parliamentary draftsman is no reason for not attempting it." 129 The report of the
English Law Reform Committee comments that, "However desirable such proposals may be in theory, in the end they founder
on the difficulty of evolving a definition which, without being
too complex to be practicable, succeeds in drawing the line in
approximately the right place."130 There might, of course, be some
sense in insisting that lives relevant to the dispositions in the
instrument of gift should be used. But that would invite the
making of illusory gifts, and the exclusion of beneficiaries of
these as lives in being would involve all of the problems which
used to be involved in determining when an appointment under
a power was illusory.131 In short, the position of the British Law
Reform Commission is persuasive. However, if no one who was
not a beneficiary of the instrument of gift could be a "life in being," much of the rule's mathematical complexity would be
eliminated.
As a means of diminishing the attractiveness to draftsmen of
selecting numerous lives as measuring lives, the British Law Re128 MORRIS AND LEACH, 66.
120 Id. at 67.
130 Law Reform Committee Report 7.
131 Cases concerning the doctrine of illusory

appointments (which is not generally
followed in this country) are collected in 100 A.L.R. 343 (1936). The doctrine was abolished
in England by statute. 11 Geo. 4 and I Wm. 4, c. 46 (1830).
·
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form Committee has proposed that an 80-year period in gross
might be desirable. 132 This period would be available as an alternative to lives in being and 21 years, but, once selected, it would
apparently be exclusive. It would also be tied in with the notion,
discussed in the next subdivision, that the validity of future interests should depend upon whether they in fact vest within the
limits of time, not upon whether they might not have-the principle denominated "wait and see." Such a reform would have
more appeal to the British bar than in this country because of
the fashion in England of employing so-called "royal lives clauses"
as a means of comprehending a maximum number of measuring
lives. 133 In this country the equivalent of such clauses is seldom
used as a technique of draftsmanship and lives in being hence do
not as often become so hard to determine and measure. It must
be admitted, however, that a fixed period in gross, which might
be available as a concurrent instead of an exclusive alternative,
has about it a fascination founded in simplicity.
The third suggestion concerning the period of the rule, i.e.,
lengthening the 21-year period in gross, is also not without appeal
if one accepts the supposition that the shortness of the period is
likely to preclude the withholding of capital from the grandchildren of the maker of a gift beyond their minorities. 134 There
are, however, two basic fallacies in this supposition. First, a testator who provides for distribution of his estate among his grandchildren when they reach 35 or 40 or upon the expiration of a
period of 21 years from the death of the last to die of all of the
beneficiaries of his will living at his death, whichever event occurs
first, will almost always succeed in keeping funds out of the hands
of his grandchildren before they reach the age specified. Only if the
testator specifies an advanced age of distribution, say 50 or 60, or
if he is young and has no grandchildren living at his death, is
it likely that relevant lives in being at his death plus 21 years will
expire while the grandchildren are younger than the age which
is specified as that at which distribution is to be made to them.
Second, if the rule is truly concerned with remoteness of vesting
alone, distribution from grandchildren can be theoretically withheld from them until they reach any age, provided of course that
the draftsman makes certain (if that is possible to do) that they

132 Law Reform Committee Report 7, 30.
133 Id. at 6.
134 MORRIS AND LEACH, 67-68; SIMES, PUBUC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND

68-69 (1955).
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attain interests which are vested both in quality and quantity
within the period of the rule. Despite these observations it may
well be that the 21-year period in gross should be extended, for
even if the rule continues to be directed at remoteness of vesting
the extension of this period would at least facilitate the making of
valid gifts over to the issue of grandchildren who died under an
age of distribution in excess of 21 and this seems a reasonable
objective. Also, should a rule directed against remoteness of possession be deemed desirable, or should such a rule in fact exist in
a rule which limits the duration of trusts to the perpetuity period,
there would be instances (e.g., if the maker of a dispositive instrument had no grandchildren in esse when the instrument took
effect) where distribution could not be withheld after grandchildren attained 21 without resort to the doubtful expedient of
selecting irrelevant lives as measuring lives.135 Should the 21-year
period in gross be extended, a period of 30 years ought to be adequate136 and a period of 40 years would probably be the maximum
that ought to be adopted.
The view that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
should be subject to temporal restrictions in the form of a period
in gross appears to be sound unless one is prepared to espouse
the more flexible view that courts should simply be given the
power to decree such interests to be no longer valid when they
either served no useful purpose or had ceased to do so.137 As
already observed, all proponents of reform seem to agree that
these interests should not be allowed to continue unfettered,
and there seems also to be considerable agreement that alternative
periods of validity should be allowed, i.e., some period in gross
and also the period of the rule against perpetuities. 138 Since lives
in being almost never have anything to do with determinable fees
or fees subject to rights of entry, it is very difficult indeed to see
why the common law perpetuity period should be adopted, even
as an alternative, to control the duration of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. If they are to be subject to restrictions
135

Cf. Law Reform Committee Report 6-7.

136 Cf. Wis Stat. (1955) §230.15.
137 "A more sensitive treatment of the

problem, perhaps ·by way of conferring equitable jurisdiction to extinguish such interests when they have ceased to serve any useful
purpose, might be thought preferable." Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486
at 492-493, 130 N.E. (2d) Ill at 115 (1955) (per Schaefer, J.). See also CAREY AND SCHUYLER,
(Supp. 1954) §55.
138 Law Reform Committee Report 20, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 211; SIMES, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 76-77 (1955).
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in time, then they should become void after the expiration of
a fixed period of time. The same should be true of attempted
executory gifts over following determinable fees and fees subject
to conditions subsequent, except in the case of an executory gift
over which is incident to a family settlement. For example, in the
case of a gift to A for life, remainder to his first born son, but
if the latter dies without issue then over, the period of the common law rule (or any modification of it) should apply. The foregoing discussion is of course not pertinent to possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry incident to commercial transactions
(e.g., a lease or a mortgage) which should not be fettered in any
way by time restrictions.
The last suggestion for reforming the period of the rulethat a period in gross should apply to options in gross-is similar
to the view urged in the preceding paragraph. Since options are
commercial devices they cannot sensibly be subjected to time
restrictions measured by lives in being any more than possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry. Here again it seems clear that if a
time restriction is adopted, some period of validity should be
selected and that options in gross should be valid for that period
and thereafter become ineffective. In other words, as in the case·
of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, if too long a time
were specified in the instrument creating the option, the option
should not be invalid from its inception but void only as to the
excess.
2. The Principle Should Be "Wait and See." From what has
been said it is apparent that the requirement of absolute certainty
of vesting and the total invalidation of offensive interests have
been major objects of criticism of the rule. Several cures have
been advanced. The most popular is the so-called "wait and see"
principle.139 Under this principle, the validity of future interests
would not be determined at the date of their creation; one would
wait to see whether any future interests which might have violated the rule did or would in fact violate it. As will appear,
advocates of "wait and see" do not all agree how long the waiting
period should be. The proposal, however, will be better under139 The principle of "wait and see" is approved in .the articles, notes and texts
cited note 72 supra. It is criticized in: Phipps, "The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities," 23 TEMP. L. Q. 20 (1949); comment, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158 (1950); note, 26
TEMP. L. Q. 148 (1952); Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed," 52 MICH. L.
REv. 179 (1953); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 at
726-728, 732-733 (1955); SIMES, PUBUC Poucy AND THE DEAD HAND 72-73 (1955).
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stood by referring back to some of the examples of invalid interests which have already been given. Testamentary gifts are assumed in each instance.
I. Gift in trust to pay income to A for life, and upon his
death to distribute the corpus to the eldest son of A, living
at his death, who becomes a college graduate. 140 If you waited
until A died and you saw that he had a son who was a college
graduate, the gift over would be valid.
2. Gift to A for life, remainder to his widow for life, remainder to such of A's children as are living at the widow's
death. 141 If you waited until A died and you saw that his
widow was a woman who had been born at the testator's
death, the gift over would be valid.
3. Gift to A for life, remainder to such of his children as
attain 25.142 If you waited until A died and you saw that
he had at that time no child, born after the testator's death,
who at A's death was under four years old, the gift over
would be valid.
A serious question arising in connection with the principle of
"wait and see" is how long do you wait to see? Suppose in example I that A had no son living at his death who had graduated
from college, but he did have a son alive who was two years old.
Would you say that since the rule was not satisfied at A's death
the ultimate gift was bad? Or would you wait another 21 years,
i.e., until the period of the rule expired, to see whether A's son
did in fact graduate from college within the limits of time?
Suppose in example 2 that the widow of A turns out to be a
woman who was not living at the testator's death. Do you hold
the gift over bad at A's death? Or do you wait for 21 years to
see if the widow lives that long? Suppose in example 3 that A
has children alive at his death but some of them are not four
years old. Do you say that none can take? Or do you wait and see
whether the children of A who were under four when A died
themselves die before another 21 years passes? Or do you split
the class at A's death and say that his children who were four
years old or more at A's death may take to the exclusion of the
others?
Advocates of the "wait and see" principle have given different
answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraph. In
140 l'. 697 supra.
Hl Pp. 697-698 supra.
142 P. 701 supra.

714

MICHIGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[Vol. 56

Pennsylvania the 1947 modification of the rule against perpetuities provides that, "Upon the expiration of the period allowed
by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by
actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested
and any interest in members of a class the membership of which
is then subject to increase shall be void." 143 Apparently you wait
as long as the law allows and you see what the situation is then.
In Massachusetts, the 1954 modification of the rule provides
that the validity of a future interest limited to take effect at or
after the termination of one or more life estates or lives in being
"shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the termination of such one or more life estates or lives." A life estate is
defined to include "an interest which must terminate not later
than the death of one or more persons" even though it may
terminate at an earlier time.144 This statute, applying as it does
only where antecedent estates precede the future interests
affected, is obviously narrower in scope than the Pennsylvania
statute. Also, the period during which you "wait" is not the
whole period of the rule but only until the ending of the preceding estate. Thus the Massachusetts statute would, in each of the
three foregoing examples, allow you to "wait" until A's qeath
and then "see"; in Pennsylvania you would presumably "wait"
the longer periods suggested in the preceding paragraph. The
English Law Reform Commission suggests what may be a middle
ground, i.e., that you "wait" until you are able to "see" either
that a questionable limitation could never vest within the period
of the rule or until events showed that it could never vest outside the period.145 The Pennsylvania statute may mean the same
thing but it does not expressly say so.
The Pennsylvania "wait and see" doctrine gives rise to great
and admitted difficulties in connection with the determination
of who are to be counted as measuring lives. 146 These can, as has
been suggested,147 be solved if the courts construe the statute as

148 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
144 Mass. Laws Ann. (1955)

1950) tit. 20, §301.4.
c. 184A, §1.
145 Law Reform Committee Report 10-11.
.
146 Comments, 97 UNIV. PAL. REv. 263 at 267-268 (1948); 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158 at
1166-1169 (1950); Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 ,MICH. L. REv.
179 at 186-188 (1953); Cohan, "The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity DoctrineNew Kernels from Old Nutshells," 28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 at 330-336 (1955); MORRIS AND
LEACH, 86-88.
147 Cohan, "The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from
Old Nutshells," 28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 at 336 (1955).
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contemplating the same measuring lives as would be used in the
application of the common law rule, excepting only that actual
rather than possible events would be considered. But even such
an interpretation will require considerable litigationu8-a fact
which hardly recommends adoption of such a statute as a means
of simplifying a complicated rule of property. Moreover, waiting
out the entire period of the rule, or even until the interests in
question must or cannot vest within that period would, in the
case of non-trust dispositions, render many titles unmarketable
for a far longer time than would be the case today. For instance,
in examples 1 and 2 above, one would know at once under existing law that the future interests were invalid, whereas under the
Pennsylvania statute and the English proposal it would be necessary in example 1 to wait and see if A's son graduated from college or died within 21 years from the date of A's death, and in
example 2 to wait and see whether A's widow (if she were unborn
at the testator's death) died within 21 years after A's death. A
similar waiting period could of course be required by the instrument of gift, thus producing like results in terms of marketability,
but this fact is not an answer to Professor Simes' telling comment that, "to tie up property for the period of the rule, and
then eventually to prohibit a testator from doing what he wishes
with his own property after all, would seem to be backed by
no public policy whatsoever."H9 An instrument of gift which by
its terms ties up property for the maximum period allowed by
the law and no longer is not open to this objection because in
such a case one will know from the beginning that the future
interests are valid.
The Massachusetts statute to some extent meets the problems
created by the Pennsylvania statute, because in Massachusetts
validity will be passed upon only when antecedent life estates or
their equivalent terminate. 1150 These life estates will undoubtedly
be valid because under Massachusetts law the vice of remoteness

HS MoRRis AND LEACH, 88: "In most of the cases that will actually arise; the Pennsylvania statute will no doubt be easily workable. But it will unquestionably require a
substantial amount of litigation to clarify its application. Such litigation will take time
and meanwhile the exact state of the law will be in doubt.•••" Italics supplied.
Hll Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 MICH. L. REv. 179 at 190
(1953).
llSO The writer accepts Professor Leach's statement as authority for the statement
in the text. Leach, "An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities,"
39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 21 (1954). " ••• [I]t is standard practice for courts to refuse
to pass upon the validity of the remainder until ••• [the anterior estates have ended]."
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inherent in future interests apparently does not affect the validity
of prior interests. 151 Therefore the property is neither tied up
nor is a determination of validity deferred for longer than was
the case under the common law rule. But in a jurisdiction where
the doctrine of "infectious invalidity" prevails, a statute ,would
be an anomaly which would prevent a determination of the invalidity of future interests until the ending of prior estates which
might themselves be invalid if the future interests turned out,
upon a "wait and see" basis, to be too remote. And even in a
jurisdiction where the doctrine of infectious invalidity is not
-recognized there may still be a good deal of inconvenience attendant upon waiting until all prior estates are ended for an adjudication of the status of future interests. The English Law Reform
Committee recognizes this and would apparently allow applications for the determination of the validity of future interests to be
made at any time; but the court could only make a final declaration with respect to interests which events, at the time of application, had shown to be certain to vest or incapable of vesting withip. the period of the rule. Under the English proposal an absolutely final adjudication could not be made until "events showed
that the limitation could never vest within the period" or that
"it could never vest outside the period."152 This proposal has
the disadvantage of involving the possibility of several judicial
interpretations as to the perpetuity aspects of the same instrument, as contrasted with the once-and-for-all-time system afforded
by the present rule and, it must be admitted, by the Massachusetts
statute.
It is apparent that each "wait and see" approach has its disadvantages. Each indubitably widens the scope of dead-hand control-perhaps, however, not to the extent of "dooming" the
rule against perpetuities as Professor Simes has forcefully
argued. 153 But an advocate of reform who is not convinced by
Professor Simes should nevertheless heed the other imbroglios,
indicated above, into which the principle of "wait and see" may
lead-particularly the tangible and intangible costs of interim
uncertainty.
3. Reforming Invalid Limitations. Almost seventy years ago
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Edgerly v. Barker,154'
1516 .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47.
11S2 Law Reform Committee Report 11.
111s Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities
11S4 66
434, 31 A. 900 (1891).

N.H.

Doomed?" 52

MICH.

L. REv 179 (1953).
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without the aid of any statute, held that a gift to the testator's
grandchildren when the youngest reached 40 should be transmuted into a gift to them when the youngest reached 21, thus
saving the gift from destruction. The court said that the intent
that the grandchildren should take was paramount to the intent
that they should take at a particular time and that this dominant
intent should be carried into effect cy pres. Professors Leach11515
and Simes,1156 following an earlier suggestion of Judge Quarles,1157
advocate widespread adoption of the New Hampshire court's
position, through legislation where necessary,158 in order to
mitigate the harshness of the rule against perpetuities. Presumably
this judicial cy pres power would be extended not only to the
reduction of age contingencies as in Edgerly v. Barker, but also
to other alterations in gifts such as closing or splitting a class of
beneficiaries in a manner designed to avoid offense to the rule,
or shortening a period at the end of which a future interest
should vest. Thus if a gift were made to all and every the greatgrandchildren of a testator when the youngest reached 21, a
court might say that the gift should be made to read to "all and
every my greatgrandchildren, being children of such of my grandchildren as are living at my death, when the youngest of them attains 21." Or, in the case of a testamentary gift to "such of the
children of A as attain 25," a court might either alter the age 25 to
21 or it might close or split the class of takers, as in the preceding
example, by adding the words "within 21 years from the death
of the last to die of A and all of his children who are living at
my death" after the words and figure "attain 25." Or, if property

155 Leach: "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1329 at 1336-1338 (1938); "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of .the Innocents," 68 L. Q.
R.Ev. 35 at 51 (1952); "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,"
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 735-736 (1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style,"
67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 at 1353-1354 (1954); "Perpetuities Reform by Legislation," 70
L. Q. R.Ev. 478 at 490, 491 (1954); "An Act Modifying and Clarifying ,the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MAss. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 24 (1954).
156Simes: "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 -MICH. L. REV. 179 at
193-194 (1953); "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 728,
733-736 (1955); PUBUC PoUCY AND THE DEAD HAND 69, 76-79 (1955).
157 Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trust for Accumulation," 21 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. R.Ev. 384 (1946).
See also Looker, "Rules Against Perpetuities,'' 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 832 (1955); Bogert,
"Public Policy and the Dead Hand: A Special ,Book Review,'' 6 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 51 at
57 (1956).
158 Cf. the statute recently adopted in Vermont which directs the court to reform
any interest which would violate the rule to effectuate the intention of the creator of
the interest. Vermont Laws (1957) No. 157.
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were given by will to A for life, remainder for life to any widow
of his (thus making difficult an interpretation that a widow who
was a life in being at the time of the gift was meant), remainder
to such of A's children as may be living at the death of the widow,
a court might say that the gift to the widow should be made to
read, "remainder to any widow of A's until her death or until
the expiration of 21 years from the death of the last to die of all
of the beneficiaries of this will who are living at my death." In
each instance, validity would supplant invalidity.
The difficulty with the cy pres approach is the high degree
of uncertainty that it introduces into the effect of dispositive
instruments. This uncertainty would probably not constitute, as
uncertainty sometimes does, an impetus to perpetuity litigation,
since the beneficiaries of an instrument of doubtful validity would
almost surely resist a declaration of invalidity whether the cy pres
power existe!I or not. However, the existence of a power to rewrite an otherwise invalid gift would involve nebulous speculations into what the maker of the gift would have wanted if he
had known that his attempted gift was bad. For instance, in the
case of a contingent class gift payable to the children of A when
the youngest reaches 25, would the testator prefer that the age
contingency should be reduced to 21 or that the class should
comprehend only children of A who were living at the testator's
death? The answer to this question will never be definitive and is
bound to vary from case to case. It involves, moreover, the most
delicate and intangible aspects of the interpretative process. Nor
is it an answer that the cy pres power works well in cases where
gifts for general charitable purposes fail or that courts are faced
in other cases with determining what a testator would have
wanted under some unanticipated circumstance. In the charitable
trust cases we accept the cy pres doctrine because we feel that a
general charitable intent is meritorious and should be given effect
as a matter of public policy. No public policy demands that solicitude for private dispositions should be carried to the point of
injecting into perpetuity cases, which are complicated enough at
best, the most difficult of all construction problems, i.e., that of
deciding what a dead man would have thought had he thought
about something that he didn't think about. 1159 The average chancellor is too busy to balance carefully the many factors which
159 Schuyler, "Future Interests in Illinois: Current Maturities and Some Futures,"
50 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 457 at 538-539 (1955).
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ought to be weighed before an answer to this troublesome interpretative enigma is attempted. As a result, the solution of
perpetuity problems is likely to become more involved if a cy pres
solution is attempted, and fewer cases are likely to be resolved
at a nisi prius level. The protraction and increased cost of litigation, familiar to every chancery practitioner, which would attend
this result may well have induced proponents of reform to shun
cy pres in connection with recent Massachusetts legislation.160
No doubt these considerations also-prompted rejection of cy pres
by the English Law Reform Committee with the statement, "We
are far from convinced that the complexities inherent in such
a vague and uncertain jurisdiction would be outweighted by any
practical advantage." 161
That cy pres offers an impracticable solution to perpetuity
problems is not to say that invalid limitations cannot be remolded
satisfactorily and with more certainty. Since 1925, section 163
of the English Law of Property Act162 has provided in substance
that if an interest would violate the rule because it is contingent
upon attainment or failure to attain an age in excess of 21, the age
of 21 shall be substituted for the age specified. This section would
validate many of the invalid types of gifts of which examples are
given earlier in this discussion. So, if property were given to A
for life, remainder to such of his children as reach 25, the age
21 would supplant the age 25. Or if the gift were to A for life,
remainder to his first born daughter, but if such daughter shall
die under 25 leaving children surviving her, then to such children, a like substitution would be made. The same would be true
of a gift to A for life, remainder to his first born son who reaches
25. In each instance, the automatic alteration of the age contingency saves an othenvise void gift. It has been said that this section cures "the most common single cause of violations of the
Rule" and that the absence of litigation concerning it shows that
it has worked well. 163 Gray, on the other hand, thought that the

160 Leach, "Perpetuities Reform by Legislation," 70 L. Q. REv. 478 at 490 (1954):
"The objection in Massachusetts [to cy pres] is a practical one: it was, in our judgment,
just too big a step for our judges and lawyers to take.•••" Leach, "An Act Modifying
and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 24 (1954):
" •.. [I]t is considered preferable at this time to dispose of the great majority of cases
by a simple statute [automatically reducing age contingencies] unlikely to cause litigation
than to try to remedy all cases by a less specific statute [providing for cy pres]."
161 Law Reform Committee Report 16.
102 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §163 (1925).
163 MORRIS AND LEACH, 54.
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section would take property from persons whom the testator
meant to have it and transfer it to others. 164 But surely that is
less true of section 163 than it is of the rule itself, and section 163
has the distinct merit of ameliorating the harshness of the rule
without injecting the vagueness and uncertainty of~ the cy pres
doctrine. A more cogent criticism may be that the effect of the
section is to put capital into the hands of beneficiaries before
their training has readied them to receive it. 165 Again, however,
it seems probable that the makers of most gifts would rather have
their beneficiaries take at too early an age than not take at all.
However, five members of the English Law Reform Committee
would not apply section 163 or its equivalent until it was determined whether the questionable limitations did in fact vest
within the period of the rule. 166 In other words, they would first
apply the principle of "wait and see." A majority of the English
Law Reform Committee did not subscribe to this view; they
would apply section 163 first and then, if necessary, "wait and
see."161

The English Law Reform Committee suggests still a further
means of reforming class gifts to comply with the rule. If, after
applying section 163, and after having "waited and seen," some
of the members of a class did not attain vested interests within
· the limits of time, the committee suggests that those members
of the class who did attain such interests in timely fashion should
be allowed to take.168 This of course involves a rejection of the
rule of Leake v. Robinson169 and an acceptance of Professor
Leach's theory that class gifts should not be regarded as indivisible
for purposes of the rule. A case could arise if a testator made a
gift to such of A's grandchildren as attain 25. The gift is invalid
unless at the testator's death A and his children are dead, or unless a grandchild has attained 25 thus closing the class. Testing
the effect of section 163, the gift is still too remote because A
may have children after the testator dies and they may have children who may reach 21 (substituted for 25) and they may not
do so until more than 21 years after the death of A and all of

164 GRAY, §872.
165 Law Reform

Committee Report (dissenting note by Mr. Burrows and Dr. Morris
in which three other members of the committee of 12 concurred) 34.
166Id. at 34-35.
167 Law Reform Committee Report 15.
168 Id. at 14, 15.
169 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817).
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his children and grandchildren who were alive when the testator
died. Presumably, therefore, section 163 will not apply at all
since its application is limited to cases where it would save the
gift from destruction. We would therefore "wait and see" whether all of A's grandchildren will take or whether the class must
be split. Presumably we shall wait until the death of A and all
of his children and grandchildren who were living at the testator's
death or until A's oldest grandchild reaches 25, whichever
event occurs first, since the class would be closed at all events
upon the happening of the latter event. If the death of all relevant lives in being is the event which marks the end of the "wait
and see" period, all of A's grandchildren who are four years old
or more at that time, even children of children of A who were
not living at the testator's death, will be able to share in the gift
because all of such grandchildren must reach 25 or die thereunder
within 21 years from the expiration of the relevant lives. On the
other hand, splitting the class without "waiting and seeing" would
make the gift good only as to grandchildren of A who were alive
at the testator's death. Obviously, the effect of the "wait and see"
principle in terms of the number of grandchildren who would
share in the gift would depend entirely on how many grandchildren were born during the "wait and see" period. Since this
would vary so much in individual situations, it is by no means
easy to appraise the benefit of "waiting and seeing" in terms of
its effect upon what testators might generally prefer. The difficulties of applying the principle of "wait and see" in other situations have already been discussed; there are no like problems
involved in confining a class, as of a testator's death, to persons
whose interests will necessarily be irrevocably fixed within the
period of the rule. The only real objection to splitting class gifts
arises from the fact that it may frustrate intention to an even
greater degree than would the intestacy which would flow from
complete invalidity. 170 Perhaps the splitting of classes in apt
situations could be best accomplished by legislative indications
170 Professor Leach, who argued with great force .that there was no basis for the
English view that class gifts are indivisible, also suggested ·that, "It is a problem of
construction, similar to that which is faced by a court when it declares one section of a
statute unconstitutional: Is the amputated portion so vital to the body that it cannot
survive the amputation?" Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51
HARv. L. REv. 1329 at 1338 (1938). More recently he may have partially recanted. MORRIS
AND LEACH, 125: "These suggestions [concerning class gifts] are analogous to • . . the
doctrine of 'Infectious Invalidity.' • • • [This] doctrine • • • has not been adopted by
English courts, nor (in the opinion of •.• [Dr. Morris]) is it desirable that it should be."
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that instruments should be construed, where possible, so as not
to violate the rule, 171 rather than by legislative mandates as to
the splitting of class gifts. Unless the latter were tempered with
a direction that courts investigate what the testator would have
preferred under the circumstances a good many injustices might
result. That would be very close to a mandatory cy pres approach
with all of its inherent problems already described.
4. Adopting Realistic Presumptions. As has been seen, the
fantastic hypotheses of which the common law rule requires acceptance often cause gifts to be held to be too remote. These hypotheses fall into two broad categories: (I) the assumption that the
procreation of offspring may occur at any age; and (2) the assumption that administrative contingencies, though highly unlikely
to occur beyond the period of the rule, may in fact do so.
As to the presumption of fertility, the English Law Reform
Committee would eliminate it and substitute in its place a rebuttable presumption that no woman who has attained 55 is
capable of bearing a child and that no person under 14 is
capable of procreating or bearing a child. In addition, the committee would permit the introduction of medical evidence to
establish such incapacity. If subsequent events should rebut the
presumption or confute the evidence, any decision based upon
either would be allowed to stand. But an afterborn child who,
according to the decision, could not have been born, would be
able to pursue any property rights (even to the point of following or tracing) which it might have and which did not violate
the rule.1.72
To illustrate how the English Law Reform Committee proposal would work, let there be supposed a gift to the grandchildren of the testator's daughter A to be divided among them
when all and every the said grandchildren of A attain 25. At
the testator's death A is 56 years old and has a daughter B who is
24 years old. B has two children, C and D, six and four years old.
Under the common law rule the gift to A's grandchildren is
invalid. Nor will it be validated by the application of section 163
of the Law of Property Act which, if it applied, would reduce
l.71.SIMES, Ptrauc POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 74 (1955): " .•. [T]here should be a
rule of construction to this effect: If there is a possibility of invalidity under the Rule,
the court should construe .the language of the will to effectuate as nearly as possible
what the testator would have intended at the time of his death ·had he then known
that the application of the Rule might make all or a part of the will invalid."
172Law Reform Committee Report 9, 31.
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to 21 the age contingency upon which the grandchildren of A
were to take. Section 163 is therefore inapplicable because it
"operates on a limitation either at once or not at all. . . ." 173 If,
however, A can have no more grandchildren the gift to her grandchildren is good. Applying the presumption of inability to bear
children at an age in excess of 55, we find that A can have no
more children. Allowing and relying upon medical evidence, we
find that B has been sterilized and can have no more children.
The gift is saved without even "waiting and seeing." Twenty-one
years pass and C, A's youngest grandchild, reaches 25. Distribution is made to B and C; the class may be closed because no more
grandchildren may be born. Then, B, at the age of 45 confounding her gynecologist, has another child, E. The decision that
the gift to A's grandchildren was valid stands even though "the
subsequent birth of a child . . . shows the evidence to be erroneous. . . ." 174 But if E (the grandchild who couldn't be born)
attains 25 within 21 years from the death of the last to die of A,
B, C and D, E's interest will, on a "wait and see" basis, prove
to be valid. Evidently E would be able, under the English proposal, to force C and D to disgorge part of what they had received, for E has a right to property "that in the event is not
itself void for perpetuity," and "that right (including any right
to follow or trace the property) is not prejudiced by the decision
of the court."175
The advantage of presumptions suggested by the English
Law Reform Committee and of receiving and relying upon medical evidence as to capacity to have offspring are apparent. In
many cases, these proposals would validate otherwise void but
harmless future interests. Furthermore, even though the Law
Reform Committee favors the "wait and see" approach, the
proposals under discussion would often eliminate the necessity
of resort to the "wait and see" principle so that the validity or
invalidity of future interests could be determined at a much
earlier date than would be possible on a strictly "wait and see"
basis. However, one cannot wax enthusiastic over the suggestion
that if events rebut the presumption of infertility or prove medical evidence to have been erroneous, an afterbom child should
in some cases be permitted to upset distributions already made

173 Id. at
174. Id. at
11:i Ibid.

15.

9.
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with the Sanction of a judicial decree. This reinjects uncertainty
and quite plainly could place distributees under such a decree in
an equivocal position.
In respect of other improbable possibilities, the so-called
administrative contingency cases such as a gift contingent upon
the probate of a will, the payment of debts or when an estate
is settled, Professor Simes has suggested that there should be
statutory directions that such conditions shall be deemed to be
contemplated to occur within 21 years.176 The Law Reform Committee rejects this solution on the footing that "a satisfactorily
exhaustive enumeration of . . . [traps to be excluded] would
be difficult to devise and, however well formulated, would leave
untouched the more general criticism that even where real as
distinct from theoretical possibilities are concerned, it is wrong
that the rule should invalidate gifts which in fact vest within the
permitted period. . . ." 177 Admitting the difficulty of composing
an all-inclusive list of contingencies to be embraced by a statute,
it seems likely that Professor Simes' objective could be achieved
in part by specific- legislation and in part by the creation of a
statutory direction that, for perpetuity purposes, there shall be
a presumption that the maker of an instrument of gift intended
validly to dispose of his property. Such a presumption would
be of assistance in the administrative contingency cases and it
ought also to aid in eliminating many of the other undesirable
results which flow from the requirement of absolute certainty of
vesting.178
5. Discarding the Rule's Vest. Since the major objective of
this article is to weigh the validity of exempting vested interests
from the rule, the suggestion that the concept of vesting as a test
of validity should be discarded is mentioned here only for the
sake of completeness and will be touched upon only briefly at
this point. Professor Simes has indicated that reversions and other
future interests incident to long term leases and other commercial
transactions would have to be exempt from a rule against perpetuities directed at remoteness of possession.179 He seems also to
feel that equitable interests in income should be regarded as
possessory interests.18° Finally, he suggests that litigation over the
176 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 77 (1955).
177 Law Reform Committee Report 10.
178 Cf. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 74 (1955).
179 Id. at 81.

1so Ibid.
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vested or contingent character of future interests could perhaps
more safely be eliminated by treating as contingent all future
interests limited to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the
ending of a life estate.181 The merit of these and other possibilities can be adequately measured only after the concept of vesting
as a whole has been considered. First it will be well to summarize
the other suggestions for reform of the rule which have been discussed since some of these may well be interwoven with the
possibility of removing the rule's vest.

C. Comments Concerning the Foregoing
As to some criticisms and proposed reforms of the common
law rule against perpetuities there can be little disagreement.
The period of the rule, perhaps not altogether logical, has caused
but mild comment. Extending the 21-year period in gross to 30
or 40 years and introducing an alternative period of 7 5 or 80
years might be desirable, especially if the rule should be made
applicable to remoteness of possession. Rights of entry and possibilities of reverter, unless incident to long term commercial devices such as leases and mortgages, ought to be made subject to
temporal restrictions. Except in family settlements, however, a
fixed period of time, perhaps 30 to 50 years, should apply. Resulting trust interests (or possibilities thereof) should probably also
be subject to the rule. In the case of trusts for particular charitable
purposes, however, this would require the introduction of a
modified executive cy pres power, for if a resulting trust could
not take effect if a particular charity ceased to exist after the
period of the rule expired, what would be done with the property?
Subjecting resulting trusts, arising when the purposes of a private
trust were no longer capable of accomplishment, to the rule would
almost necessitate a concomitant rule that all private trusts must
end within the period of the rule. Again, if this were not so, what
disposition would be made of the trust property if the resulting
trust were void? Options appendant to long-term leases and mortgages, being commercial devices, should be clearly exempted
from the rule. So should administrative powers of trustees, if
private trusts are to be allowed to last longer than the period of
the rule. These powers further rather than defeat the rule's
objectives. If options in gross are to be subject to temporal restric-

181 Id. at

82.
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tion, the restriction should be a fixed period and they should
be valid during that period.
A large area of agreement also exists with respect to the rule's
harshness in its requirement of absolute certainty, in its acceptance of fantastic hypotheses, in its application to class gifts and
in its total invalidation of interests which transgress it. Disagreement exists as to the remedy. The automatic reduction of age
contingencies in excess of 21 years to 21, the creation of a presumption of infertility with respect to infants, aged women and
perhaps aged men, and the opening of the door to the admission
of medical evidence of incapacity to produce offspring would supplant fantasy with logic. So would a presumption that those disposing of property want to do so validly. Among other things,
such a presumption might encourage the splitting of classes where
this would save class gifts from the rule without injecting the
perhaps undesirable inflexibility which the mandatory splitting
of classes for that purpose would create. On the other hand, a
broad grant to courts of a cy pres power to reform otherwise. void
limitations would make for considerable uncertainty, might protract and add to the cost of perpetuity litigation, and for these
reasons seems to the writer to be unwise. The principle of "wait
and see" is highly controversial and although it solves some problems it certainly adds new ones. If it is to be adopted at all it
must be in modified form. In a jurisdiction which recognizes the
doctrine of "infectious invalidity," the "wait and see" principle
is wholly impracticable. However, as will later be suggested in
more detailed fashion, if some sort of a statutory "saving clause"
could be devised so that antecedent interests would automatically
end when the period of the rule expired, all of the· advantages of
"wait and see" could be achieved without running afoul of the
greatest objection to it, i.e., interim uncertainty. The difficulty
lies in drafting a satisfactory statutory direction as to the destination of property when the period of the rule expires before the
event upon which future interests are specified to take effect has
occurred. This problem is especially acute in cases where the
instrument of gift has created future interests limited to take
effect upon alternative contingencies which, but for the proposed
statutory "saving clause," would be too remote.
[To be concluded.]

